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1. INTRODUCTION 
The atheistic hiddenness argument goes like this: if there is a traditional 
theistic personal God, then this God must be perfectly loving. Such a God 
would always seek to have loving relationships with other persons and 
would always provide whatever is necessary for each capable person to have 
a loving relationship with him. Next, the argument points out that participa-
tion in such a relationship requires belief in the existence of God, and that 
this belief in turn requires sufficient evidence of God’s existence. Therefore, 
the existence of God entails the existence of sufficient theistic evidence. The 
argument indicates that there are some capable open-minded persons who do 
not believe that there is a God, which implies that the actual theistic evi-
dence is insufficient for the belief. The argument ends with the atheistic 
conclusion. In a nutshell, the hiddenness argument says that the apparent 
divine hiddenness, i.e., the lack of evidence of God’s existence, is a sure 
sign of God’s non-existence. 
In this paper, I address one troublesome feature of this argument, namely, 
that it implicitly rests on the idea that some people are incapable of having 
a loving relationship with God. According to J. L. Schellenberg, the author 
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of the hiddenness argument, to participate in a loving relationship with God, 
a person must possess specific cognitive and affective abilities.1 Those who 
are mentally disabled or demented, those who have certain atypical neurolo-
gies, and those children who have not yet developed the required capabilities 
cannot have this relationship—not by their choice but by their nature. The 
argument, on the one hand, exalts the perfection of the divine love to such an 
extent that the existence of a loving God cannot be reconciled with the lack 
of theistic evidence. On the other hand, it allows this perfect divine love to 
be compatible with the existence of human beings who are unfit for a loving 
relationship with God. 
I contend that such treatment of divine love is inconsistent. I try to remove 
this inconsistency by conceiving of a divine-human loving relationship in such 
a way that no natural human condition would be an obstacle to it. I suggest 
that such a nondiscriminatory loving relationship could be accomplished by 
God’s having a physical relationship with human beings. First, I demonstrate 
how the success of the hiddenness argument depends on the truth of the 
“consciousness constraint” on the divine-human loving relationship. In order 
to demonstrate that, I provide my own statement of the argument, which 
picks out this consciousness constraint as its indispensable element. Second, 
I introduce the idea of a physical relationship with God and provide reasons 
for holding that a loving God would prefer a physical relationship with 
human beings rather than a consciousness-constrained relationship. Third, 
I offer an interpretation of apparent divine hiddenness in the light of the idea 
of God’s openness for a physical relationship. 
2. THE HIDDENNESS ARGUMENT WITH A CONSCIOUSNESS CONSTRAINT 
Both theists and atheists generally agree that the traditional monotheistic 
idea of a personal God implies that this God would love people and would 
always want to have a loving relationship with them. However, the bare no-
tion of divine love does not tell us what exactly this loving relationship 
should be. There are different kinds of human loving relationships, such as 
 
1 Schellenberg suggests that “these would involve such things as a capacity at the time in ques-
tion to feel the presence of God, recognizing it as such; a capacity to exhibit attitudes of trust, grati-
tude, and obedience to God, and so on”; see SCHELLENBERG’S “Divine Hiddenness and Human 
Philosophy,” in Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief: New Perspectives, ed. Adam Green and Ele-
onore Stump (Cambridge: CUP, 2015), 21n15. 




a loving relationship of a bride with the groom, of a king with his subjects, 
or of a mother with her baby. Possibly, one of these relationships is what 
God would want to have with people. It is also possible that God would pre-
fer something else, which is either analogous to these human relationships or 
completely different from them. After all, God could have a personality that 
is quite different from a human personality.2 We ought to be careful about 
making a priori assumptions concerning the form of interaction with people 
that would be most pleasing to God and we should be wary of ascribing our 
own relational preferences to him.3 Still, a discussion of the hiddenness ar-
gument requires at least a minimal concept of God’s loving relationship with 
people. For this purpose, it suffices to have a parsimonious notion of “God’s 
favorite kind of relationship”: 
God’s favorite kind of relationship =df a kind of loving relationship that 
God would always want to have with any person. 
This definition, despite its generality, has several specific constituents. 
First, it points out that this is a loving relationship, which, among other things, 
implies freedom of participation, because God would not force anyone into 
it. Second, God would always want to have this relationship with a person, 
not only when the person reaches, say, the afterlife or a certain stage of de-
velopment. Third, God would want this relationship for the sake of the rela-
tionship itself, not only as a means to an end.4 Finally, the definition has 
a fourth constituent—any person—which points out that God would want to 
have this kind of relationship regardless of the character and circumstances 
of the other participant. 
 
2 Here I follow Michael Rea, who suggests that “God might have a genuine, robust personality” 
and “his preferred mode of interaction”; see Michael REA, “Narrative, Liturgy, and the Hiddenness of 
God,” in Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump, ed. Kevin Timpe (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 86. 
3 Unlike Michael Rea et al. (e.g., his The Hiddenness of God [Oxford: OUP, 2018], chap. 4 and 5), 
I do not suggest a strong skeptical maneuver here, that is, I do not imply that God’s preferences are 
incomprehensible to us. I agree with Rea that the problem of divine hiddenness trades on “violated 
expectations” concerning the nature of divine love (ibid., chap. 2). In this paper, however, instead of 
Rea’s apophatic approach, I suggest the opposite—that God’s preferred mode of interaction is not 
incomprehensible, as Rea suggests, but rather might be familiar to us and, perhaps, even more familiar 
than one might expect. 
4 I borrow these three constituents from Schellenberg’s own treatment of divine love in order 
to have a starting point that we both agree upon—see, e.g., his “Divine Hiddenness and Human 
Philosophy,” in GREEN and STUMP, Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief, 19–20. 
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My concept of God’s favorite kind of relationship also suggests that there 
are kinds of loving relationships that God would not always want to have. As 
I mentioned, there are various human relationships that are considered to be 
loving and praiseworthy. However, the mere fact that we value and desire a 
certain kind of loving relationship does not entail that God would necessarily 
want that too, let alone always want to have that with any person. Some ad-
mirable human loving relationships might be unsuitable for God. For example, 
I do not think that God would always want to be everyone’s best buddy or, 
even less likely, to relate to people as a loving disciple to the teacher or as a 
loving child to the parent. Of course, it does not mean that God would 
always refrain from having anything but God’s favorite kind of relationship. 
Perhaps in some situations other relationships could be pleasing to God or at 
least serve as a means to achieve a desired outcome. Consider an analogy: 
a philosopher’s loving husband would from time to time consent to play the 
role of an enthusiastic audience when his wife gives a philosophical lecture 
at the family dinner table, but that is not what he really wants their relation-
ship to always look like. There is a difference between God’s provisional 
consent to participate in a relationship that is conditioned by circumstances, 
and God’s being unconditionally predisposed to a certain kind of relation-
ship. God’s favorite kind of relationship is about the latter. 
What else could be said a priori about God’s favorite kind of relation-
ship? This relationship, by definition, is something that God would always 
want. Thus, it would be reasonable to assume that there would never be any 
omissions on God’s part for it to happen. Schellenberg describes the same 
idea in terms of God’s being open to relationship. He writes, “If thus open to 
relationship, God sees to it that nothing God does or fails to do puts relation-
ship with God out of reach for finite persons at the time in question” (empha-
sis in the original).5 In other words, God would always provide whatever is 
necessary for every person to participate in God’s favorite kind of relation-
ship with him. This idea of divine openness to relationship can be transformed 
into a hiddenness-argument-style premise, which I shall use as a starting point 
for my statement of the argument: 
(1) If there is a God, then God always provides whatever is necessary for 
God’s favorite kind of relationship with a person. 
 
5 J. L. SCHELLENBERG, The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God 
(New York: OUP, 2015), 41. 




So far, so good. But what exactly would God have to do for this relation-
ship to happen? Is there anything else that we can know a priori about God’s 
favorite kind of relationship that could help us in answering this question? 
Schellenberg insists that this kind of relationship has a necessary property of 
being conscious,6 which means that it is “a relationship one recognizes one-
self to be in”7 and recognizes the presence of God as such.8 Let us define this 
conscious kind of relationship (hereafter CR) formally. 
CR  =df a kind of relationship such that for any persons S1 and S2 and time t, 
if S1 and S2 at t are in a CR, then S1 at t is conscious of being in the relation-
ship with S2 and S2 at t is conscious of being in the relationship with S1. 
A necessary condition for a CR is that both parties at the time in question 
are conscious of being in the relationship with one another, which means 
that both of them must (i) be conscious of being in the relationship and (ii) 
consciously recognize the other party. There are many examples of CR 
among human relationships, such as friendship or romantic love. Some hu-
man relationships, however, do not satisfy the above condition and thus do 
not qualify as CR. Sometimes one of the parties fails to recognize the other, 
as for example in the case of a relationship with a demented person, who 
mistakes you for someone else. Sometimes one of the parties is not con-
scious of being in the relationship, as in the case of a relationship with 
a person who is far on the autism spectrum and does not apprehend what it 
means to be in a relationship. 
Schellenberg assumes that a loving relationship that God would always 
want to have with any person is such that the person should always be con-
scious of being in the relationship with God;9 or, to put it in our terms, that 
God’s favorite kind of relationship is a CR. This is a key assumption both 
 
6 This is how Schellenberg characterizes a personal relationship. I think that specifying a relation-
ship as “personal” does no significant work here. Schellenberg’s reasoning has the following structure: 
(i) necessarily, God would want a personal relationship; (ii) necessarily, personal relationships are such 
and such; therefore, (iii) necessarily, God would want such and such relationship. I believe that the 
meaning of the predicate “personal” is not sufficiently clear by itself, while Schellenberg’s definition 
of “personal” is identical with the second premise of the above syllogism, which makes it ineffective as 
the middle term. Therefore, I prefer to eliminate the questionable middle term and deal directly with 
the conclusion. 
7 SCHELLENBERG, “Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy,” 23. 
8 See SCHELLENBERG, The Hiddenness Argument, 40.  
9 See, e.g., SCHELLENBERG, “Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy,” 17–18; SCHELLENBERG, 
The Hiddenness Argument, 96. 
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for the success of the hiddenness argument and for the purposes of this paper. 
Thus, I should single it out as a separate premise: 
(2) God’s favorite kind of relationship is a CR. 
Premise (2) is a constraint on the range of possibilities for divine-human 
loving relationships. First, it limits the number of human beings who can 
participate in a loving relationship with God by making it available only to 
those who possess certain cognitive and affective capabilities. Second, it 
restricts the realm of divine-human loving interactions by making them con-
tingent on those cognitive and affective capabilities. Following Terence Cuneo, 
I label this constraint “the consciousness constraint.”10 The consciousness 
constraint and, more specifically, premise (2) will be the main target of my 
criticism of the hiddenness argument. But before I turn to it, let us proceed 
with our premises for the argument.  
Now, with premise (2) in mind, we can ask: What exactly should God do for 
every person to participate in a CR with him? Here comes the well-known part 
of Schellenberg’s argument, which deals with belief, evidence, and nonre-
sistant nonbelievers. It goes roughly like this: in order to participate in any 
CR with God one must be conscious of being in a relationship with God. 
Yet, one cannot be conscious of being in a relationship with God unless one 
believes that God exists, and this belief requires evidence. So, if God had 
provided everyone with whatever is necessary for their belief in his existence, 
then there would be sufficient evidence of God’s existence available to all. In 
that case, it would be impossible for belief-capable people not to believe that 
there is a God unless they deliberately resist this belief. However, some people 
are nonresistant nonbelievers. Therefore, it is not the case that every person 
has whatever is necessary for any CR with God. 
For the purposes of this paper there is no need to explicate each step of 
the above line of reasoning, so, I wrap them up in a single premise: 
(3) It is not the case that God always provides whatever is necessary for 
any CR with a person. 
I take premise (3) as true: I agree with Schellenberg that theistic belief is nec-
essary for any CR with God, that theistic belief requires sufficient theistic 
 
10 Cuneo introduces the consciousness constraint as a problematic claim regarding the nature of 
a divine-human loving relationship. He outlines it as follows: “God would have to do whatever God 
could to ensure that humans are always able just by trying to engage in a meaningful conscious 
relationship with God wherein they apprehend God as God”; see Terence CUNEO, “Another Look at 
Divine Hiddenness,” Religious Studies 49, no. 2 (2013): 157. 




evidence, and that the universally available evidence is insufficient for theistic 
belief. In other words, I do not think that God’s existence is sufficiently 
obvious for many people to be epistemically justified in seeking a relation-
ship with God.  
Premise (3) is the final piece of my statement of the hiddenness argument. 
Here is the argument in its full form: 
(1) If there is a God, then God always provides whatever is necessary for 
God’s favorite kind of relationship with a person. [Premise] 
(2) God’s favorite kind of relationship is a conscious relationship (CR). 
[Premise] 
(3) It is not the case that God always provides whatever is necessary for 
any CR with a person. [Premise] 
(4) It is not the case that God always provides whatever is necessary for 
God’s favorite kind of relationship with a person. [From (2) & (3)] 
(5) There is no God. [From (1) & (4)]11 
The truth of the conclusion (5) depends on the truth of premises (1), (2), 
and (3).12 I consider (1) and (3) as true, and (2) as false. Thus, in the rest of 
the paper I shall argue against (2), and, more generally, against the con-
sciousness constraint on a divine-human relationship. 
The easiest way to reject (2) is to point out its lack of support. Schellen-
berg treats it as being necessarily true, as something that logically follows 
from the very concept of perfect divine love.13 I think that (2) is possible and 
 
11 It should be noted that this is my own statement of the hiddenness argument. I believe, however, 
that this statement is faithful to Schellenberg’s reasoning. Of course, I stand to be corrected. 
12 The main thrust of objections against the Hiddenness Argument is typically aimed at premise (1): 
the critics argue that God might have overriding reasons to withhold evidence of his existence from 
people. A brief summary of the objections against (1) and (3) can be found in Veronika WEIDNER’S 
Examining Schellenberg’s Hiddenness Argument (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 157–75. 
13 See, e.g., J. L. SCHELLENBERG, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals: A Collaborative Dis-
cussion,” in Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser (New 
York: CUP, 2002), 50–51, or SCHELLENBERG, “Reply to Aijaz and Weidler on Hiddenness,” Inter-
national Journal for Philosophy of Religion 64 (2008): 136–37. Schellenberg argues that the sort of 
love that can be a great-making property in God must be conscious, because conscious love is better 
than the opposite (“Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy,” 18, 26; The Hiddenness Argument, 
106). Moreover, in his reply to CUNEO’s “Another Look at Divine Hiddenness,” Schellenberg claims 
that the major flaw of Cuneo’s argument is the assumption that “the notion that conscious interaction 
is only contingently tied to union and intimacy of the sort we admire and seek in love” (J. L. SCHEL-
LENBERG, “Replies to my Colleagues,” Religious Studies 49, no. 2 [2013]: 266; emphasis in the 
original). I agree that many people, including myself at this stage of my life, appreciate human-
human loving relationships with conscious interaction more than the ones without it. It is not clear to 
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even tenable. I do not agree, however, that (2) is a necessary truth. Why 
must a relationship that God would always want to have with any person 
necessarily include the person’s conscious awareness of being in relationship 
with God? Unless persons are reduced to their consciousness, personal be-
ings may possess other capacities that could facilitate the relationship. Con-
sider such complex persons as human beings. From a position of intellectual 
humility, I do not see a priori reasons to insist that God would prefer to 
connect with finite human minds. We may presume that our mind is the 
bearer of the likeness of God. We may cherish the idea that our affective and 
cognitive facets of selfhood are the best things we can offer to God in a per-
sonal relationship. God, however, might have a different view of our emo-
tional and intellectual value. Simply put, it is possible that those aspects of 
human nature that are vitally important for God’s favorite kind of relation-
ship “just ain’t in the head.”14 Until proven otherwise, (2) cannot be accepted 
either as necessarily true or as plausible. 
This paper could end right here, for a key premise of the hiddenness ar-
gument has been shown to be unfounded. But that would be far too easy. 
After all, (2) is possible, and in the absence of any alternative it would still 
remain the most plausible solution on the table. Thus, to strengthen my case, 
I need to offer a viable alternative to (2). For that, I need to set forth a kind 
of relationship that is not a CR and that could count as a plausible candidate 
for God’s favorite kind of relationship. 
Before I offer my alternative to (2), I briefly examine a potential alterna-
tive to (2) that others have already proposed. There are several responses to 
the hiddenness argument that use a common strategy: they introduce a spe-
cial kind of human relationship with God, which could be labeled as quasi-
conscious relationship (hereafter quasi-CR). 
Quasi-CR with God =df a kind of relationship with God such that for any 
person S and time t, if S at t is in a quasi-CR with God, then S at t is not 
conscious of being in relationship with God and S at t is conscious of being 
in relationship with quasi-God, 
where “quasi-God” is a manifestation, an aspect, or a representation of God 
for S. A typical example of a human-human quasi-CR would be a child writing 
 
me, however, why conscious loving relationships are objectively better than other loving relation-
ships and why conscious interaction is a non-contingent component of an admirable love. 
14 I borrow this application of Hilary Putnam’s phrase to divine-human relationship from Terence 
CUNEO, as well as some of his insights concerning the falsity of the consciousness constraint on the 
divine love (“Another Look at Divine Hiddenness,” 154, 157–62). 




letters to and receiving gifts from Santa Claus, who is in fact her father. 
A well-known theological example of a quasi-CR with God is Karl Rahner’s 
idea of anonymous Christians, who receive the grace from God without be-
lieving in the Christian God.15 
Some authors suggest that it is possible for human beings to have a quasi-
CR with God, that is, to be in relationship with God without being aware that 
their relationship is with God but being aware of their relationship with 
a superior entity, i.e., a quasi-God. Instead of God, a person can relate to the 
ultimate Good, to the Eternal,16 to the Absolute, to the Unknown,17 to the 
manifestations of goodness and beauty in the world,18 to acts of self-sacrificial 
love,19 or to their conscience.20 It is often assumed that such quasi-CR could 
be acceptable to God. I do not intend to contest this assumption. But it poses 
no threat to (2). In order to reject (2), we need to find a non-CR kind of 
relationship that could be God’s favorite kind of relationship. Yet none of the 
foregoing authors even suppose, let alone claim, that their quasi-CR is indeed 
what God would always want to have with people. All they assume is that God 
could provisionally accept a quasi-CR as sufficient to start down the path of 
developing a CR with the person. They do not deny that God’s favorite kind of 
relationship is a CR. Therefore, their strategy does not provide a genuine 
alternative to (2). 
In what follows, I offer a genuine alternative to CR as God’s favorite 
kind of relationship, which I characterize as a physical relationship. I do not, 
however, simply offer one tenable idea over another tenable idea. I argue 
that this physical relationship, which is a consciousness-independent relation-
ship, is a more plausible candidate for being God’s favorite kind of relationship 
than a CR, which in turn entails that (2) is implausible and the hiddenness 
argument is unsuccessful. 
 
15 See, e.g., Karl RAHNER, “Anonymous Christians,” in Theological Investigations, vol. 6, Con-
cerning Vatican Council II, trans. Karl-H. Kruger and Boniface Kruger, (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 
1969), 390–98. 
16 William WAINWRIGHT, “Jonathan Edwards and the Hiddenness of God,” in HOWARD-SNYDER 
and MOSER, Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, 113–14. 
17 Jamie M. FERREIRA, “A Kierkegaardian View of Divine Hiddenness,” in HOWARD-SNYDER 
and MOSER, Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, 164–80. 
18 CUNEO, “Another Look at Divine Hiddenness,” 161. 
19 Paul K. MOSER, “Divine Hiddenness and Self-Sacrifice,” in GREEN and STUMP, Hidden Divinity 
and Religious Belief. 
20 Stephen EVANS, “Can God Be Hidden and Evident at the Same Time? Some Kierkegaardian 
Reflections,” Faith and Philosophy 23, no. 3 (2006): 247. 
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3. PHYSICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH GOD 
Before addressing divine-human physical relationships, let me explain 
what I mean by physical relationships in general. I understand a relationship 
as a direct, personal interaction between personal beings. Some personal 
actions primarily address the body (e.g., feeding, protecting, giving shelter) 
in order to bring about a certain physical state. What I mean by “primarily” 
is that the action might also have a mental effect (e.g., elicit joy or grati-
tude), yet this mental effect is not the main purpose of the action. Let us 
label such actions physically oriented actions. Apart from physically oriented 
actions, there are personal actions that primarily address the mind (e.g., joking, 
comforting, apologizing) in order to bring about a certain mental state. These 
mentally oriented actions might include a physical component (e.g., hugging or 
shaking hands), yet their main purpose is not concerned with the body. In addi-
tion, there are dual personal actions that address both mind and body, and their 
purpose is to bring about a certain mental state as well as a certain physical 
state. In what follows, I shall not be interested either in mentally oriented ac-
tions or in dual actions, only in physically oriented actions. 
A physical relationship is a kind of relationship that essentially consists 
of physically oriented actions. The word “essentially” here means that even 
if a physical relationship is accompanied by mentally oriented actions or mental 
effects of the physically oriented actions, these mental ingredients do not 
constitute the nature of the relationship. Common examples of physical rela-
tionships include all sorts of physical care—medical, social, domestic, etc. 
that help people to meet their physical needs.21 What is important about 
physical relationships is that they are consciousness-independent. Such rela-
tionships exist regardless of whether one of the parties is conscious, quasi-
conscious, or non-conscious of the relationship with the other party. Examples 
of limited conscious awareness in physical relationships include a mother’s 
care for her baby, who is not conscious of being in a relationship, or an adult 
daughter’s care for her senile father, who does not recognize her as his 
daughter, or a nurse’s care for a minimally conscious patient, who is neither 
aware of the relationship nor recognizes anyone.  
 
21 Following Engster, I understand care as “everything we do directly to help individuals to meet 
their vital biological needs, develop or maintain their basic capabilities, and avoid or alleviate 
unnecessary or unwanted pain and suffering, so that they can survive, develop and function in 
society” (Daniel ENGSTER, The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory [Oxford: OUP, 
2007], 29). 




One might object that a genuine relationship must be reciprocal, that is, it 
must include an actual response to a personal action, whereas passive recep-
tion of physical care does not qualify as a valid response. Here we ought to 
distinguish between a completely unresponsive person (e.g., in a coma) and 
a person who is not conscious of being in the relationship with the other party. 
Reciprocal interaction with the former is indeed problematic, while reciprocity 
with the latter is quite possible. All it takes for a person to participate in 
a physical relationship is to be capable of perceiving the action and reacting to 
it accordingly, which neither requires awareness of being in a relationship nor 
recognition of the other party. If the person can physically respond to the per-
sonalized action—eat the offered food, cooperate while being washed or 
dressed, etc.—that would be enough to constitute genuine reciprocity.  
One might also object that the aforementioned cases of physical care are 
not relationships, but only parts or stages of relationships that at some point 
necessarily involve mutual conscious awareness and recognition. For example, 
nursing and geriatric care are the first and the last phases of lifelong relation-
ships, and these phases ought to be considered within the context of the whole 
story. But what if there is no other story apart from the physical relationship? 
Would the absence of the conscious phase invalidate the relationship? I don’t 
think so. These physical relationships might be accompanied by the caregiver’s 
expectations or hopes of a conscious response: the mother looks forward to 
her baby becoming aware of her love some day, and the adult woman caring 
for her demented father yearns for his moments of clarity when he recognizes 
her as his daughter. Nevertheless, in these cases the conscious response is not 
the main purpose of the physical care. And even if that response never occurs, 
these relationships would still count as genuine. 
Finally, one might object that consciousness-independent relationships in 
general and physical relationships in particular are somehow deficient in 
comparison with fully functional, conscious relationships (CR); thus, they 
should not be treated as genuine relationships, but only as simulacra, flawed 
copies of the real thing. This objection might be relevant within a conceptual 
framework where physical is considered inferior to the mental. Otherwise, 
I do not see any sustainable reasons to treat consciousness-independent rela-
tionships as relationships of lower quality than CR. Moreover, certain physi-
cal relationships are superior to any CR, for they are the most fundamental, 
definitive, and vital among human relationships. For example, maternal care 
for the child’s life, safety, and well-being is an archetype for our understand-
ing of true love and selfless devotion to another person. This care provides 
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a foundation for the child’s development of attachment, which, in turn, equips 
the child for future relationships. In this sense, all CR should be treated as 
derivatives of the physical relationship of a mother and child, not vice versa.  
Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that physical relationships can be 
genuine relationships and that they are quite common among human beings. 
Let us now consider whether it would be possible to have a physical rela-
tionship with God. Note that the hiddenness argument deals with the personal 
God of traditional monotheistic religions, who is generally conceived as 
immaterial perfect Being; so let us adhere to this concept of God. Could 
a non-physical God have physical relationship with human beings? Is that 
metaphysically possible? In order to give an affirmative answer to this ques-
tion, I suggest that we employ another indispensable element of the tradi-
tional concept of God: the idea of God being the creator and sustainer of the 
material world. This idea entails the possibility of interaction of an immaterial 
creator with the material creation. As creator and sustainer of the physical 
world, God could cause a physical event that brings about an intended physi-
cal effect in a person’s life, and that would qualify as a physically oriented 
action—the constituent of physical relationship. In return, the person could 
physically cooperate with the divine action in order to bring about the intended 
physical effect, and that would qualify as the reciprocal physically oriented 
action—another constituent of physical relationship. 
At this point, no need exists to provide an exhaustive account of physical 
relationships with God; it suffices to acknowledge their possibility. Never-
theless, a few examples may be helpful. The first example is from a particu-
lar traditional theistic religion: Orthodox, Catholic, and Lutheran Christians 
believe that in the sacrament of Holy Communion the incarnate God offers 
his physical body as food to his people, and people physically partake of it, 
thus consummating the physical relationship of “becoming one body” with 
God. The second example is from a more general theistic context, where 
a typical loving physical relationship with God has the following form: God 
bestows physical gifts personally on a beloved human being, who responds 
by accepting those gifts and making proper use of them. 
The foregoing considerations support the idea that a physical relationship 
with God is metaphysically possible. If that idea is sound, then it is also pos-
sible that the following is true: 
(2*) God’s favorite kind of relationship is a physical relationship. 




Earlier I argued against the plausibility of premise (2) in my statement of the 
hiddenness argument by pointing out its lack of support. That was sufficient 
to suspend (2); yet, that was not sufficient to repudiate it. Here I have of-
fered (2*) as a possible alternative to (2). Without any support, however, 
(2*) may seem no more plausible than (2). Thus, I need to provide rein-
forcement for (2*). I obtain it from natural theology by using the physical 
world as evidence in our investigation concerning God’s favorite kind of re-
lationship. The following discussion presupposes that God is the creator of 
the universe. Henceforth I omit the repetitive conditional antecedent “if there 
is a God and if God has created our world” to save space. 
One reason to accept (2*) is based on the fact that human nature, among 
other things, is physical (I take that as obviously true). It is reasonable to 
assume that God has created human beings as the most fitting partners for 
his favorite kind of relationship. Suppose that God’s favorite kind of rela-
tionship is not a physical relationship. Clearly, God could have created purely 
non-physical partners for this relationship. It would make little sense for God 
to complicate the relationship by binding his partners for a non-physical re-
lationship with a physical nature. Nonetheless, God has created his partners 
as beings with a physical nature. One might suggest that God could have had 
some additional reasons to make the relationship more complicated. Still, 
ceteris paribus, (2*) is the simplest explanation: we have a physical nature 
because God wanted to have a physical relationship. 
Another reason to accept (2*) is founded on the observation that physical 
relationships are the most common and fundamental relationships in our 
world. God has created this world in order to have a very particular relation-
ship with human beings. But how would they know what kind of relationship 
God wants to have with them? In order to ensure that human beings choose 
the right thing, God could have left signs and clues in the creation that 
would reveal God’s favorite kind of relationship. God could do even better 
than signs and clues: he could have implanted the pattern of this relationship 
into the very structure of the world. I find it very likely that God designed 
the world in such a way that his favorite kind of relationship would be the 
most evident, familiar, and common to its inhabitants, so that human beings 
would not need to face any hardship in learning and adjusting to God’s favorite 
kind of relationship because they would already have a natural inclination 
and affinity to it. Thus, it is plausible to assume that the most common and 
basic relationship in our world has the greatest probability of being God’s 
favorite kind of relationship. It seems that the most basic relationships, which 
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sustain our natural order, are physical relationships. If one is to single out 
the most fundamental relationship, then, as argued earlier, that would be the 
maternal-filial relationship, which is the archetype and the foundation for all 
other loving relationships. 
Schellenberg, too, uses maternal love as a close analogy to God’s love.22 
However, his discussion of the maternal-filial relationship centers on the 
child’s expectations from the mother, as if the child’s conscious awareness 
of the relationship with the mother is a necessary component of their rela-
tionship. In other words, Schellenberg treats maternal-filial relationship as a 
CR.23 But is it really a CR, or is it, as I suggest, a physical relationship? This 
relationship necessarily includes the mother’s constant worry about whether 
the child is fed, clean, warm, healthy, and safe, which starts from the first 
moments of the child’s life and does not wane even when the child becomes 
an adult. In the course of time, the mother and child might develop additional 
aspects of their relationship, such as psychological care, friendship, or part-
nership. However, these additional aspects come and go, while the compul-
sion of mother’s physical care remains unyielding. The mental aspects of the 
maternal-filial relationship are contingent upon culture and individual cir-
cumstances, whereas the physical aspect is predetermined by nature. There-
fore, the maternal-filial relationship is essentially physical. And if we con-
ceive of divine love by analogy with maternal love, then we should conclude 
that God’s favorite kind of relationship is a physical relationship. 
In light of the above reasons, we can assume that (2*) is probable. Yet its 
being merely probable is not sufficient to reject (2) conclusively. For that, 
I need to demonstrate that (2*) is more probable than (2). 
To compare probabilities of (2) and (2*), consider two possible worlds. In 
both worlds there are human beings like us, and there is a God who always 
provides whatever is necessary for God’s favorite kind of relationship with 
 
22 See, e.g., J. L. SCHELLENBERG, “Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism,” in Contemporary 
Debates in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon (Malden, 
MA: Blackwell, 2004), 33–34. 
23 Describing maternal love, Schellenberg writes: “The perfectly loving parent, for example, 
from the time the child can first respond to her at all until death separates them, will, insofar as she 
can help it, see to it that nothing she does ever puts relationship with herself out of reach for her 
child” (J. L. SCHELLENBERG, “The Hiddenness Argument Revisited (I),” in Religious Studies 41, no. 
2 (2005): 203). It is worth noting that Schellenberg starts the timeframe of the relationship with “the 
time the child can first respond to her at all.” The cited statement would be true even without the 
temporal limit (i.e., “from the first moment of the child’s life until death”). It would make little 
sense to limit the timeframe, unless one wants to emphasize a conscious aspect of the relationship. 




a person. The first world—call it Solaris—is a world where (2) is true. The 
second world—call it Arcadia—is a world where (2*) is true.  
In Solaris, God always wants to have a CR with every person, so God al-
ways provides all people with sufficient evidence of his existence. What 
kind of evidence would suffice? I tend to agree with Schellenberg that it 
should be an abiding internal non-sensory experience of an ultimate and lov-
ing reality.24 Those in Solaris who have the cognitive and affective capacity 
to be conscious of being in relationship with God interpret their experience 
so that they believe in the existence of a loving God and consciously respond 
to him. Thus they enter into a CR with God. As their relationship with God 
develops, they start experiencing more particular forms of God’s presence, 
which they interpret as forgiving, comforting, or guiding. 
In Arcadia, God’s relationship with human beings is physical. God indi-
vidually bestows physical gifts on a person, for instance, food, clothing, 
bathing, and healing, and the person responds to that by receiving the gifts. 
This interaction occurs at multiple specifically appointed places. All it takes 
for a person to have the relationship with God is to be present at the right 
place and not decline the gift. Those who are physically unable to come by 
themselves can attend with the help of others. Many of the attendants are 
conscious of having a relationship with God. Some, however, do not have 
a proper concept of God and think that they have a relationship with a different 
entity. Some do not grasp the nature of personal relationships and receive 
God’s gifts only for practical reasons. And some have no understanding of 
what’s going on whatsoever and respond to God’s actions instinctively. 
Nevertheless, God has his favorite relationship with all of them regardless of 
the nature of their conscious awareness. 
Consider two important differences between Solaris and Arcadia. The 
first difference concerns the freedom of human participation in the relationship 
with God. The inhabitants of Arcadia are genuinely free to accept or reject 
God’s invitation to the relationship, whereas in Solaris this freedom is 
compromised. In Arcadia, the relationship with God occurs at specific places 
and it has the form of physical interaction; it is never out of reach for anyone 
and it does not obstruct the regular flow of human daily life. It is within 
ordinary human powers to stay either in or out of those places, and either to 
participate or refrain from the interaction. 
 
24 See Schellenberg’s description of a world where God is not hidden (his Divine Hiddenness and 
Human Reason [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993], 48–52). Presumably, neither sensory nor 
sporadic experience is sufficient to secure the persisting theistic belief; plus, external evidence of God 
is less likely to elicit a personal response. 
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In Solaris, the situation is different. The God of Solaris always makes sure 
that his existence is sufficiently evident to every person at every moment. 
The non-sensory experience of God in Solaris is continuous, unsolicited, and 
uncontrolled by the recipient. It is beyond ordinary human powers to take 
even a short break from experiencing God in Solaris, and one cannot achieve 
that without breaking the relationship.25 The God of Solaris is like a friend 
who constantly follows you just to make sure that you never doubt her exist-
ence, and the only way to stop feeling her presence is to shut down your 
senses or chase her away.26 This God, by demanding people’s love, traverses 
their personal boundaries and deprives people of their autonomy.27 He forces 
the experience of his presence upon human minds, which produces compli-
ance rather than love.28 A perfectly loving God would seek to preserve human 
freedom and would prefer the consciousness-independent relationship of Ar-
cadia to the consciousness-constrained relationship of Solaris.29 
The second difference concerns the accessibility of the relationship with 
God to various groups of people. The most disturbing consequence of the 
consciousness constraint on divine-human relationships is that it segregates 
people based on their natural condition. There are people in Solaris who are 
by nature not eligible for God’s favorite kind of relationship. To have access 
to a CR with God, one must have the capacity to be conscious of being in 
relationship with God, which implies that one must possess mental faculties 
that allow to be in a relationship, to be aware of being in relationship, to have 
 
25 The only way to stop that experience would be via some unnatural procedure of blocking 
one’s non-sensory perception of God’s presence. Such blocking would be culpable both spiritually 
and epistemically and would be tantamount to an act of defiance. 
26 One might suggest a scenario of a non-obtrusive religious experience (e.g., where the experi-
ence is bestowed upon request). Schellenberg, too, insists that God would not suffocate people with 
attention (J. L. SCHELLENBERG, The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in 
God [New York: OUP, 2015], 40). Such a scenario, however, would threaten the requirement that 
God must make sure that every person always has evidence sufficient for belief in God’s existence. 
27 Schellenberg allows that God would not “intervene in the lives of nonresistant believers, 
perhaps disruptively, to give them evidence sufficient for belief” (The Hiddenness Argument, 106, 
emphasis mine). Even so, the autonomy of those who doubt or disbelieve would still be disrupted.  
28 Schellenberg suggests that religious experience could provide the required evidence without 
significantly removing human freedom (“What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 38). I agree that 
some measure of freedom might be preserved; nevertheless, some measure of freedom would still be 
lost. Therefore, a scenario where no freedom is lost, ceteris paribus, would be more preferable than 
this one. 
29 The idea that divine hiddenness is a necessary condition for maintaining human free will is not 
new, its discussion is multifaceted, and the literature is vast. That discussion, however, is beyond the 
scope of this paper. All I need here is to demonstrate that, from the perspective of human freedom, (2*) 
is more plausible than (2). 




an adequate concept of God, to form a belief that God exists, and, on top of that, 
to be able to identify the other party as God. Meeting these requirements is 
beyond the mental capabilities of little children, demented elderly, mentally 
handicapped, psychologically traumatized, autistic people, and many more. 
Schellenberg rightly notes that “an omnipotent God would be able to cre-
ate us with the required mental furniture in place.”30 Why, then, are so many 
people in Solaris left without the required mental furniture for a CR? Per-
haps, we could transfer the cases of trauma, disability, and age-related infir-
mity to the problem of evil. But what about little children? Their incapacity 
for a CR obviously belongs to the natural order of things. Therefore, it was 
God himself who has decided that Solaris should be full of people who are 
unsuited for his favorite kind of relationship. Even if we could somehow 
manage to brush off the children’s unsuitability for God as some develop-
mental necessity, there is yet another group of human beings whom we can-
not easily dismiss: autistic people. Many autistic people are not capable of 
being in a CR because of their different neurology; however, they are neither 
damaged nor disabled, and they cannot be “cured” of their natural condi-
tion.31 The existence of CR-incapable people indicates that the God of So-
laris has designed a world where his favorite relationship was not intended 
for all people. As I see it, a God with such limited love does not qualify as 
perfectly loving. 
In contrast, the God of Arcadia has created a world where his favorite 
kind of relationship is available to any person who is capable of physically 
receiving his gifts, which is true of every human being. Clearly, a perfectly 
loving God would want to have a loving relationship with as many people as 
possible. That gives us another reason to believe that God would prefer con-
sciousness-independent relationships with human beings to consciousness-
constrained relationships. 
To sum up: first, it is possible that human beings could have physical re-
lationships with God. Second, it is probable that God would want to have a 
physical relationship with human beings. Finally, there are compelling rea-
sons to assume that God would prefer to have a consciousness-independent 
rather than a conscious relationship with human beings. If the latter is true, 
 
30 SCHELLENBERG, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 51. 
31 Joanna LEIDENHAG, in her “The Challenge of Autism for Relational Approaches to Theological 
Anthropology,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 23, no. 1 (2021), provides an excellent 
overview of the history of theological and psychological stigmatization of autistic people, as well as 
compelling arguments against treating autism as a disability. 
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then God’s favorite kind of relationship is not subject to the consciousness 
constraint, premise (2) of the hiddenness argument is false, and the argument 
is unsound. 
4. CODA 
It has become common in the hiddenness literature to provide made-up 
sentimental stories about personal relationships. Thus, I offer yet another 
dramatic narrative as a possible analogy to the hiddenness problem.32 Imagine 
a loving mother and her teenage son, who enjoys extreme activities, nihilistic 
music, intoxicating substances, and anti-social behavior. There was a time 
when they were close, but those days are gone. His mother still desires to 
caress him, to comb his hair, to treat his bruises, and to prepare a healthy 
meal for him, yet he regards her care as degrading and shuns it. He is no 
longer interested in whatever his mother can offer him, while his mother 
simply cannot find it in herself to keep up with his new demands. She can 
neither become nor pretend to be what he expects her to be. What she wants 
is to be his mother, not a sidekick for his self-indulgence. 
One day, the son decides that he needs a facial tattoo, but he cannot make 
up his mind concerning its design. He is tormented by indecision and finally 
reaches out to his mother for advice. His mother, however, becomes so ap-
palled that she refuses to participate in this discussion. “Why don’t you say 
something?” he cries desperately. “Sit down,” she responds softly, “I’ve 
made you breakfast.” He persists, “I don’t need your breakfast! For once, 
I need you to help me!” But she remains silent. Finally, he snaps and bolts 
from the kitchen, thinking to himself, “That woman doesn’t love me. Maybe 
she’s not even my real mother. Perhaps, I don’t even have a mother.” 
He goes away for good, looking for someone to love him the way he 
wants to be loved. Subsequently, he develops his own theory of how good 
mothers should treat their children. He remains firm in his belief that he 
doesn’t have a real mother. In the meantime, his mother has cleaned up his 
room and washed his clothes, she has prepared her best meal and has set the 
table. She is waiting for her son to come back, so that she can once again be 
a mother for him. 
 
32 This hiddenness story is a variation on Schellenberg’s dreadful drama of a lost child in his 
Analogy Argument (SCHELLENBERG, “Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism,” 31–34). 




If the main idea of this paper is correct, then God would be always open 
for a physical relationship with all human beings. It is not, however, in the 
nature of God’s love to seek conscious relationships, and he would not always 
be willing to satisfy every human expectation of intellectual or emotional 
connection with God. If people do not appreciate his physical gifts and do 
not want to remain in his presence, he would respect their choice and would 
not haunt them with constant reminders of his existence. Like the mother in 
our story, God would neither hide from nor impose himself on anyone. He 
would remain right there where he has always been, offering exactly what he 
has always been offering. It is up to people whether to stay with God or go 
look for someone more to their liking. 
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DIVINE OPENNESS FOR PHYSICAL RELATIONSHIP 
S u m m a r y  
The success of the atheistic hiddenness argument depends on the “consciousness constraint” it 
imposes on the divine-human loving relationship: namely, that this relationship requires human 
conscious awareness of being in the relationship with God. I challenge the truth of this proposition 
by introducing the concept of a physical relationship with God that is not subject to this constraint. 
I argue, first, that a physical relationship with God is metaphysically possible; second, that its plau-
sibility is supported by natural theology; and third, that a perfectly loving God would prefer physical 
relationships with human beings over consciousness-constrained relationships, because a perfectly 
loving God would prefer to preserve the integrity of human freedom of participation and allow 
inclusion of all people regardless of their natural cognitive capabilities. I also offer an interpretation 
of apparent divine hiddenness in the light of the idea of God’s openness for physical relationships. 
Keywords: divine hiddenness; Schellenberg; personal relationships; love; natural theology; divine 
creation; equality and capabilities. 
BOŻA OTWARTOŚĆ NA FIZYCZNĄ RELACJĘ 
S t r e s z c z e n i e  
Powodzenie ateistycznego argumentu z ukrycia zależy od „przymusu świadomości”, jaki nakłada 
on na bosko-ludzką relację miłosną, tj. warunku świadomości bycia w relacji z Bogiem. Podważam 




prawdziwość tego twierdzenia, wprowadzając koncepcję fizycznej relacji z Bogiem, która nie podlega 
temu przymusowi. Twierdzę, po pierwsze, że fizyczna relacja z Bogiem jest metafizycznie możliwa; 
po drugie, że jej wiarygodność jest poparta teologią naturalną; i po trzecie, że doskonale kochający 
Bóg wolałby fizyczne relacje z ludźmi niż relacje ograniczone świadomością, ponieważ doskonale 
kochający Bóg wolałby zachować integralność ludzkiej wolności uczestnictwa i umożliwić włączenie 
wszystkich ludzi bez względu na ich naturalne zdolności poznawcze. Proponuję również interpretację 
pozornej boskiej skrytości w świetle idei otwarcia Boga na relacje fizyczne. 
Słowa kluczowe: Boże ukrycie; Schellenberg; relacje osobowe; miłość; teologia naturalna; boskie 
stworzenie; równość i zdolności. 
 
